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The Chinese government has embarked upon an effort to reduce the number 
of tenants living in publicly owned housing. This is a significant challenge for 
any government, but may be especially so for a country where private 
homeownership is a new option. Out of concern that many of its citizens could 
not afford to purchase their housing units, the Chinese government created 
the Housing Provident Fund. This program, which is similar to housing fund 
programs in other countries such as Thailand and Singapore, combines a 
401(k)-like savings and retirement account with subsidized mortgage rates 
and price discounts to provide a mechanism through which an employee 
could save for, and eventually complete, a housing purchase. 
 
The housing provident fund (HPF) is very complex. It presents the participant 
with a number of options that can greatly affect their lifetime wealth. This 
paper presents a model of the HPF from the participating employee’s 
perspective, and then uses simulations to examine how the fund would affect 
the employee’s lifetime wealth under a variety of program parameters. From 
this information one can infer the optimal behavior for a rational program 
participant. It is also possible from the simulation results to infer which 
program parameters are the most likely to provide the best incentives to the 
employee to minimize the time that they stay in the program before they 
purchase their housing unit. 
 2  Buttimer, Gu and Yang 
   
Keywords 
 





Since the early 1980’s, China has maintained two separate housing systems. 
The Chinese government established the first system in the early 1950’s. In 
that system, the government, government organizations, or state-owned 
enterprises directly own and allocate housing. In the second system, 
individuals privately own housing and trade it within a free market. During 
the past two decades the Chinese government has implemented a series of 
policies designed to privatize government owned housing. 
 
Some of the difficulties that the Chinese government faces in this effort are 
similar to the difficulties that many Western governments face when 
privatizing public housing. One particular difficulty is that potential 
purchasers lack enough wealth to purchase the property outright, and they 
lack the income to make mortgage payments. To help alleviate this problem 
the Chinese government began a program under which it subsidizes savings 
for the purpose of purchasing formerly public housing. The purpose of this 
paper is to develop an economic model of the system, explore its 
comparative statics, and then illustrate its implications using a simulation 
model. 
  
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the basic 
structure of the Chinese housing system with a particular focus on the 
operation of the public housing system. This section also discusses the 
difficulties that the Chinese government has had in privatizing public 
housing. The third section explains the details of the savings subsidy system 
implemented by the Chinese government. The fourth section presents a 
utility-based economic model of the system, while the fifth section presents 
simulation results that demonstrate the wealth effects the program would 
have on participants. Finally, the sixth section examines some policy 
implications of the model, summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
 
The Chinese Housing System 
China has allowed the private development and ownership of housing since 
the early 1980’s, although the cost of privately owned housing has kept the The Chinese Housing Provident Fund   3 
 
                                                
majority of Chinese citizens from purchasing their own property.
1 Indeed, 
many of the privately developed housing units either sit empty, or are 
purchased by companies and then provided to employees at subsidized rental 
rates as part of their compensation package.
2,   3 For most Chinese citizens 
living in cities their only real choice has been to live in state-owned housing. 
 
Historically the rent that the Chinese government charges for public housing 
has been below the cost to maintain the property, much less a market rental 
rate.
4 As a result, housing was largely allocated through non-price methods. 
Usually the size and quality of the allocated housing was a function of the 
employee’s occupational rank, although seniority and family size also played 
a role in the allocation. For example, in 1998, a Senior Staff member in 
Beijing
5 would be assigned a 75 square meter apartment; a Section Director, 
i.e., a manager with approximately 10 years work experience, would be 
assigned a 100 square meter apartment, and a Department Director, i.e. a 
senior manager with 20 years work experience, would be assigned a 150 
square meter apartment.
6 In all cases the rent paid by the tenant was trivial. 




During the 1980’s and into the early 1990’s, the government became 
increasingly unwilling and unable to continue the heavy subsidization of 
rents. The nation’s central government mandated that city governments 
phase in considerable rent increases. In fact, the central government required 
rent to account for 15% of average household income by year 2000.
8 For 
example, in Shenyang rents were raised by approximately 30% annually 
from 0.15 Yuan per square meter of usable space per month to 1.98 Yuan 
per square meter in 2000. The Beijing city government raised its rent from 
1.52 Yuan to 3.05 Yuan.
9 It should be noted, however, that in some cases the 
 
1 One could argue that there are other reasons beyond income constraints for this lack of 
participation in the private sector housing market. Such reasons could include a lack of units, a 
lack of confidence in the willingness of the Chinese government to protect property rights, and a 
lack of economic sophistication on the part of potential housing owners. It is also very possible 
that the public housing is priced so far below an equilibrium market rent that it undercuts the 
private market. A thorough investigation of the reasons for this, however, is beyond the scope of 
this paper.  
2 According to the 1999 State Statistical Bureau Statistics, in 1997 and 1998 the vacancy rate for 
privately developed housing units was 51%.  
3 People’s Daily, Overseas Edition, July 11, 1998.   
4 Gu and Colwell (1997). 
5 A senior staff member would normally be somebody with a College degree and at least five 
years of work experience. 
6 People’s Daily, Overseas Edition, November 16, 1998. 
7 Statistical Yearbook of China, 1999 
8 The State Council’s Decision on Further Urban Housing Reform, [1994] no. 43, July 18, 1994 
9 Beijing City Government Housing Reform Office, Document 2000-080 4  Buttimer, Gu and Yang 
   
                                                
increased rents were then at least partially offset by direct monthly cash 
payments from the government. For example, in Beijing the near doubling of 
rents was tempered by monthly cash subsidies of between 90 and 150 Yuan 
per month. For a Senior Director living in a 150 square meter apartment, 
their rent may have increased from 228 Yuan per month to 457, but, after 




In 1990 the Chinese government began a program that encouraged occupants 
of public housing to purchase their homes. During 1998, the government 
announced that it intended to completely end the old housing allocation 
system. Although the Chinese government argues that up to 70% of the 
urban public housing had been privatized by 2000,
11 the privatization 
program was not particularly successful in its early years. It was assumed 
that one reason for this lack of success was that Chinese citizens lacked the 
wealth to make a mortgage down payment and the income to make monthly 
payments. 
 
It is probably unrealistic to believe that all residents of Chinese public 
housing will be able to eventually purchase their housing. Even in very 
affluent and developed countries such as the United States or Britain there 
are sizeable populations that lack the wealth or income to purchase their own 
housing and live in public housing. In a country such as China, where the 
social acceptability of wealth accumulation is not as strong, one might 
reasonably expect the percentage of the population living in public housing 
to be even higher. The Chinese government realizes, however, that one way 
to increase the home ownership rate is to increase the wealth level of those 
people that still live in publicly owned housing. To this end the Chinese 
government has created the housing provident fund, a savings program for 
housing purchases that also helps fund retirement for its members. 
 
China is not alone in using a provident fund system to fund retirement and 
housing savings. A number of countries, including Singapore, India, and 
Thailand, have implemented such systems, with varying degrees of success. 
Although there are some common traits in each of these systems there are 
also significant differences among them in terms of their methods and goals. 
Some programs, such as the Chinese and Singapore plans, are compulsory 
for the majority of the population. Others, such as the Thai and Indian plans, 
are voluntary for large portions of the population. The Chinese and Indian 
 
10 Ibid. 
11 People’s Daily, Overseas Edition, March 30, 2000. We note that much of China’s rural 
housing is still public, and it is not clear whether all of the housing that has been privatized has 
been sold to individuals, or if some of it has been transferred to the balance sheet of other state 
affiliated institutions. The Chinese Housing Provident Fund   5 
 
                                                
programs pay a fixed rate of return on funds invested in the program; the 
Singapore and Thai plans allow the individual to invest in a variety of asset 
classes, including annuities, stocks, bonds, and gold. 
  
Perhaps the most common trait among these plans, however, is their 
complexity. The programs require their members to make very sophisticated 
financial decisions, and endow their participants with a variety of choices. 
The next section describes the program in China in detail. 
 
 
The Housing Provident Fund System 
 
The housing provident fund was initially introduced as a pilot program in 
Shanghai in late 1991, and was extended nationwide in 1995. The program is 
open to employees of government agencies, state enterprises, universities, 
hospitals, and some semi-state companies. Recently the government has 
mandated that all eligible employees must join the program, although 
privately employed workers do not have to participate. 
 
An employee that joins the program agrees to have between 4% and 10% of 
their salary deposited into a special account in a state owned bank. While 
this account only pays the risk-free interest rate, the participant’s employer 
provides a one-for-one match for each Yuan that the employee deposits into 
the account. These employer-matching funds are deposited into the same 
account and they also earn the risk-free rate. The employee owns the account, 
and all money in it, although they can only use the funds for the purchase of 
housing.
12 Should the employee die, their funds become part of their estate. 
Once in the program, however, the employee must continue their monthly 
contributions to their HPF account until they retire, pass away, or are 
separated from their employer. The employee may not voluntarily withdraw 
from the program while they are still employed by the state or state-
sponsored entity. Except for not being able to withdraw from the program, 
this savings component of the system is very similar to 401(k) or IRA 
retirement programs in the United States.  
 
In addition to the employer-match, participants in the system also have the 
right to purchase the state-owned housing they occupy at a discount relative 
to the price the government would charge non-participants. Depending upon 
the employee’s rank, job tenure, job performance, and other factors, the 
price of the property will range between 10% and 40% of the government’s 
 
12 Upon the retirement, the employee can withdraw the entire account and use it for other 
purposes. Upon the death of the employee, their heirs have the same access to the funds that a 
retired employee would have. 6  Buttimer, Gu and Yang 
   
                                                
normal asking price. Interestingly, the program does allow the employee the 
opportunity to purchase housing that is better or larger than that to which 
their rank entitles them. In such a case the price the employee pays a 
discounted price for that portion of the unit to which they are entitled by 
rank, and the full price for the “extra” portion. For example, if a Section 
Director were entitled to a 100 square-meter unit but instead purchased a 150 
square-meter unit, they would pay the discounted price on the first 100 
square-meters of the unit and the full price on the remaining 50 square-
meters. 
  
If an employee is renting a unit and separates from their employer, they must 
either vacate the unit or pay a higher rental rate on it. If, however, they have 
purchased the unit, it is their property to keep. The employee may chose to 
continue living in the property, but they may also sell the property in a free 
market. While originally there was a five-year blackout period on reselling 
the property, that constraint was eliminated in 1997 in Shanghai, followed by 
almost all cities by 2001.  
 
The government uses two additional financial subsidies to encourage 
participation in the system. First, participants in the program are able to 
acquire mortgages at below market rates from State-owned banks. Second, 
the government waives a 10% tax normally required on housing transactions; 




A Utility-Based Model of Consumer Choice 
 
The housing provident fund (HPF) system is very complex, and requires its 
participants to make some very sophisticated financial decisions. Indeed, in 
one sense the decision as to whether or not to join HPF is not trivial. Even 
though, as mentioned earlier, it is now mandatory for currently eligible 
employees to join, a worker just entering the workforce implicitly decides to 
join the HPF when they accept government employment. If they were to 
decide to accept only private employment they could avoid joining HPF. 
While modeling the worker’s decision whether or not to take public 
employment is beyond the scope of this paper, we do use the idea that an 
individual could avoid HPF to establish our base economic case.
14   
 
13 The Peoples Daily, Overseas Edition, October 30, 1999.  
14 There is a well-established literature that examines housing consumption over the life cycle. 
Examples include Artle and Varaiya (1978), Kan (1999), and Kan (2000). That literature, 
however, generally is concerned with housing choice under where the primary constrain is a 
person’s budget and preference set. This paper specifically focuses on the incentives that the 
HPF program provides, and so uses a more narrowly defined method for analyzing the problem. 
For example, Kan (1999) considers the problem of mobility and how it affects housing choice. The Chinese Housing Provident Fund   7 
 
                                                                                                        
 
Even after an employee has joined HPF they still have a significant decision 
to make: when to actually purchase their housing. In the extreme case, an 
HPF participant could delay the purchase of housing indefinitely; in such a 
case they would essentially treat the program as a retirement fund.  
 
The government must concern itself with these choices as well. Under the 
assumption that renters are unlikely to ever accumulate enough wealth to 
purchase their housing units without the HPF program convincing tenants to 
join is a necessary condition for eventually reducing or eliminating the 
government’s ownership of housing. It is not, however, a sufficient 
condition, as the tenant must still decide exactly when to purchase the 
housing. During this interim period between the employee joining the HPF 
and purchasing their housing unit, the cost to the government is quite high 
given that the consumer continues to receive their rent subsidy and they also 
receive the savings subsidy. Clearly the government has an interest in 
reducing this time period. 
 
The model begins with the assumption that the employee maximizes lifetime 
utility, and that the marginal benefit to the employee of the HPF program is 
the difference in their total expected utility under the program compared to 
their total expected utility if they were not in the program. That is, it 
compares their total expected utility under HPF with what their utility would 
be if they were able to simply live in public housing with subsidized rental 
rates for the rest of their lives.  
 
Before building the model we must make a fundamental choice as to how we 
will proceed: we must decide whether we will work within a stochastic or 
deterministic framework. Although it is tempting to use a stochastic 
framework, we chose to work within a deterministic framework for a couple 
of reasons. First, the number of variables that we would have to treat as 
stochastic is prohibitively large.
15 Given that we are unlikely to find closed-
form solutions for our model, we are limited to solving it through numerical 
methods and generally numerical methods work for two or three stochastic 
state variables, but become untenable for larger numbers. Second, we wish 
to build as complete a model as possible so that we can determine which 
variables are the most important factors in the model. If we were to treat a 
subset of parameters as stochastic while treating the rest as deterministic we 
would necessarily limit the scope of the model, and inappropriately shift the 
focus of the model onto just a few parameters.  
 
We agree that mobility is an issue, but it is not one that directly relates to the HPF incentives that 
we wish to examine, and so we implicitly assume that the HPF participant is not mobile.  
15 At a minimum we would have to treat interest rates, house prices, employee income, market 
rents, and maintenance costs as stochastic. 8  Buttimer, Gu and Yang 
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where  U(.) is the employee’s utility function, Ht is their housing 
consumption at time t, Ct is their non-housing consumption at time t, BT is 
the amount of bequest left for their heirs upon death, PH,t is the housing price 
at time t, PC,t is the price of other goods at time t, yt is the employee’s income 
at time t, and W0 is the employee’s initial endowment. 
 
Within this utility framework, the house price and mortgage interest rate 
subsidies that the HPF provides are equivalent to reducing the price of 
housing for the employee. Usually reducing the price of a good can lead to 
either price or substitution effects (or both). In this case, however, recall that 
the reduction in housing price is only on the unit that the consumer already 
occupies, not on any larger space, so, at least in the short run, there is 
effectively no substitution effect.
16 Instead the increased income can be used 
to increase the consumption of other goods or it can be used to increase their 
savings and eventually the bequest that they make to their heirs. The leaving 
of an inheritance is especially important in Chinese culture, and increasing 
the size of the bequest is given a heavy weighting in a consumer’s utility 
function. 
 
Since the consumer maximizes their expected utility, they will elect to 
redistribute their income to their highest marginal utility use. For tractability 
the model assumes that increasing marginal consumption provides no more 
marginal utility for the consumer than does increasing the marginal bequest 
(i.e. savings). This allows the model to express the benefits of the HPF 
relative to renting in terms of the present value of net savings, i.e. the 
increase in the present value of the future bequest.
17 Given this assumption, 
the decision whether or not to join the HPF becomes a rent versus buy 
decision, albeit a very complex one. 
 
16 It is possible the consumer will elect to use the “saved” money to purchase additional housing 
units at the higher price, but this is really more of an income effect; they are changing their 
consumption bundle because they have additional money since the cost of housing they already 
occupy has changed, not because the price of the marginal unit of housing has changed. 
   
17 This future bequest amount will include any anticipated growth in the value of the housing 
itself. The consumer will have incentives to maintain and even increase the quality of the 
housing to maximize future appreciation in the property. This may well provide a positive 
externality relative to renting since renters have no incentive to maintain their property. The Chinese Housing Provident Fund   9 
 
                                                
 
The model uses the following variables: 
Ht =  market house price at time t; 
Rt =rent of the same house set by the government at time t; 
Mt =housing maintenance cost at time t; 
yt =employee’s income at time t; 
T =expected time of house sale at maturity of the mortgage loan or 
lifetime of the participant, T–τ = mortgage term; 
r
s =government-subsidized mortgage rate for HPF participants; 
r
f =bank deposit rate, used to discount cash flows and estimate interest 
earned on the housing saving account; 
g
H =house price growth rate; 
g
M =maintenance cost growth rate; 
g
R =rent growth rate; 
g
Y =income growth rate; 
Ft=balance in participant’s HPF account at time t; 
α =percentage of house price to be paid when purchasing housing under 
the program; 
β =percentage of employee’s income required to contribute to the 
housing fund; 
D=down payment as percentage of purchasing price required in 
purchasing housing under the program; 
DP=Cash amount of down payment; 
τ =time of the housing purchase under the program; 
ξ=the ratio of government’s contribution to employee’s contribution to 
the housing fund account; 
W0=the initial wealth of the participant. 
 
A Measure of Lifetime Utility 
 
The model assumes that the employee’s utility is monotonically increasing in 
net present wealth, and the employee’s income from their job remains the 
same regardless of whether or not they join HPF.
18 The key to the model’s 
analysis is that it treats renting as a pure cost to the employee, but recognizes 
that expenditures under HPF can have both a cost and an investment aspect 
to them. It is the investment aspect of the HPF program that complicates the 
measurement of the employee’s utility. Any measure must take into account 
both the additional costs of the HPF program as well as the potential returns 
 
18 This assumption allows us to avoid the consumption-smoothing problems like those discussed 
in Leung and Tse (2001) or Tse and Leung (2002). If we only maximized current utility then 
when the employee joined the program they might have an initial utility reduction, due to the 
cash flow lost by joining the program forcing them to reduce consumption. Since the consumer 
is maximizing net present wealth, however, the loss in immediate consumption is compensated 
by an increase in future consumption. 10  Buttimer, Gu and Yang 
   
                                                
it provides. This model measures the employee’s utility by measuring the net 
present value of the wealth that they have available to spend on goods other 
than the housing unit they would have had had they continued to rent.
19 By 
focusing on the other income that the employee has to spend, the model is 
able to isolate how the HPF program affects the employee’s true cost or 
benefit of participating in the system.  
 
The model defines the variable NHWRent as the wealth available for non-
housing goods under the rental system:
20
 
NHWRent = PV lifetime income – PV rental expenditures,
 
and the variable NHWHPF as the wealth available for non-housing goods 
under the HPF system: 
 
NHWHPF = PV lifetime income – PV HPF expenditures                            (3) 
 
Under HPF the expenditures can be either positive or negative. If they are 
positive, they represent a cash outflow to the employee and are a reduction 
in the income they have available to spend on non-housing goods. If they are 
negative they represent a cash inflow to the employee and increase the 
income that they have available to spend on non-housing goods. One source 
of such a negative expenditure, for example, would be capital gains on the 
purchased housing unit. 
 
Given Eqs. (2) and (3), the model can calculate the net present benefit of the 
HPF program to the employee:  
 
Net present benefit =NHWHPF – NHWRent                                                  (4) 
 
Since the model assumes that lifetime income is equal regardless of the 
employee’s decision to join or not join HPF, some simple algebra reveals 
that the determinant of the participant’s net marginal benefit is equal to the 
net present differences in the housing expenditures under renting and HPF: 
 
Net present benefit = PV rental expenditures – PV HPF expenditures         (5)
 
Equation (5) is the basic equation the model uses to examine the effects of 
joining HPF. The following sections examine the specific equations used to 




19 This wealth available to spend includes income they spend on any additional square footage of 
housing they elect to purchase under the HPF system.  
20 Again, these non-housing goods would include additional square footage purchased under 




The model assumes that there are two potential sources of income available 
to the employee, regardless of their HPF status: their salary income and their 
initial wealth.
21 Working within a continuous time framework the present 
value of initial wealth and salary income is given by:   
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If the employee were not in the HPF system they would continue to pay the 
government-set rent for the remainder of their life. This does assume that 
there will always be rental housing available.  
 
Working within a continuous-time model, this results in a lifetime present 


























Evaluating the lifetime expenditures of the consumer under the HPF 
program is much more complex. One must consider the combined rental and 
savings cash flows between the time when the employee enrolls in the 
program and when they actually purchase their house. One must consider 
mortgage and maintenance costs after the consumer purchases the house, as 
well as the sales value of the house, and the effect that these capital gains 
have on their bequest. It is possible to combine these into a single equation 
that is the HPF analog to Eq. (7): the net present expenditures of joining 
HPF:   
 
                                                 
 
21 Recall that any income generated by participating in HPF will be treated as a negative HPF 
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where each element has the following meaning: 












t + ∂ ∫ ) is the rent and contribution 
to the housing fund account prior to the purchase of the house, 











+ ∂ ∫ ) is the continuing 
contribution to the housing fund and the maintenance expense 
occurred after the purchase of the house, 











− ∂ ∫ ) is the interest payments 
for the loan
22, 
• The fourth element ( ) is the proceeds 
from selling the house less the repayment of the loan
[ ()  
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23, and  
• The last element ( ) 
represents the refund of unused employee contribution to the housing 
fund account upon exiting of the program, either upon retirement or 
death. 
() () e( 1 ) e
ff
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There are a few constraints that must be imposed upon this equation. First, θ 
is the minimum time required to accumulate enough cash in the account to 
 
22 For simplicity the model assumes an interest-only loan. One could easily incorporate an 
amortizing loan, but doing so adds nothing to the analysis and requires the addition of a new 
time parameter – the maturity date of the mortgage. 
   
23 If one is uncomfortable with the idea that the participant is “forced” to sell the house a time T, 
one can alternatively interpret this as the net capital gain (less the mortgage balance) earned on 
the house as of the participant’s maturity horizon. We thank an anonymous referee for providing 
this interpretation. The Chinese Housing Provident Fund   13 
be able to make the down payment. If this is based upon a percentage of the 
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Recently, the Chinese government has stopped requiring a specific down 
payment percentage, and has simply stated that after six months in the 
program HPF participants are eligible to purchase using whatever funds are 
in their account for their down payment. In such a case θ is simply set equal 
to six months.  
 
While θ is the minimum time that the employee must remain in the program 
in order to purchase their housing, the employee could stay in longer before 
making their purchase. In theory a person staying in the program for a 
sufficiently long period of time could accumulate more money in their 
account than is required to purchase their housing outright, i.e. without a 
mortgage. The model assumes, therefore, that upon the purchase of their 
housing the HPF participant will use all funds in the housing account, up to 
the price of the house, as their down payment. Thus the down payment (DP) 
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Marginal Benefit of Joining HPF 
 
From Eq. (5) the differences in the marginal utility of the employee from 
joining HPF is the difference in the expenditures, thus the net marginal 
benefit is given by: 14  Buttimer, Gu and Yang 
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From Eq. (12), it is clear that the housing saving program is a collection of 
several different subsidy components. Implicit in Eq. (12) is the assumption 
that the HPF program and its subsidies will remain in place for the entire 
time horizon of the participant. One can reasonably question the ability and 
willingness of the Chinese government to maintain this program and its 
subsidies if the entire Chinese population were to elect to join the program. 
If the model were to allow for the potential that the program could disappear 
in the future because its popularity precluded the Chinese government from 
continuing its subsidies, this would alter the decisions of the participant with 
respect to when they would exercise their purchase option. Doing so, 
however, would require a general equilibrium model like that of Gervais 
(2002), and would not let us address the primary goal of this paper: to 
determine the incentives facing the participant under the program as it now 
stands. 
 
The model can be used to assess the marginal contribution of each 
component with respect to the employee’s decision. This also provides a 
measure of the relative effect of each of the various subsidy policies. Table 1 
presents the signs of the various partial derivatives. 
 
The partial derivatives in Table 1 provide insights as to how the program 
will affect the wealth of the participants. For those components with positive 
derivatives, increasing the value of the factor will increase the employee’s 
marginal wealth under the program. For those factors with a negative first 
partial derivative, increasing that aspect of the program will decrease the 
participation in the program. Not surprisingly, the negative partials stem 
from costs that the participant must bear (i.e., housing price, mortgage 
amount, etc.) under the system. 
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Table 1: Comparative statics for net marginal benefit (NMB) from 
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These partial derivatives by themselves, however, do not provide enough 
information to fully analyze the benefits of the program from the perspective 
of either the participant or the government. Recall that a primary objective of 
the HPF program is to provide a mechanism through which the government 
can privatize public housing. A reason for this is that the rental rate is 
subsidized so heavily that rental income does not even cover maintenance 
costs. Presumably, the government wishes to incite the HPF participant so as 
to minimize the time between their joining and their purchase of the housing 
unit. There are also several partial derivatives with an indeterminate sign.  
For those factors, the impacts would depend upon the values of specific 
parameters. To address these issues, the next section numerically solves the 





Some numerical examples may help illustrate the implications of the above 
model. In these examples we uses parameters that are representative of the 
Chinese economy and housing market and that best allow illustration of the 
effect that HPF participation has on the employee’s utility. The model then 
conducts sensitivity analyses around these base conditions to illustrate the 
potential impacts of changes in either market conditions or the conditions of 
the program.   
 
Table 2 lists the parameters the base case simulation uses. One can classify 
the parameters as fitting into four groups: those relating to the cost of renting, 
those relating to the cost of purchasing the housing unit and its financing, 
those relating to the employee’s income and the structure of the program, 
and those relating to the timing of the employee’s decisions. 
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α = 33% 

















τ = 10 
 
There are six parameters relating to the cost of purchasing the housing unit. 
The first is the initial cost of the house at time 0, H0. It has a base value of 
175,000 Yuan. The base growth rate for housing costs, g
H, is set to 2%. The 
initial maintenance costs, M0, are 300 Yuan per year, and their growth rate, 
g
M, is initially set to 2%. Both the value of H0 and M0 are set to values that 
are in line with published values for those parameters.
24 The two final 
parameters that directly affect the housing purchase cost are the percent of 
the market price that the employee must pay, α, and the subsidized mortgage 
rate, r
s. These parameters are set to 33% and 4.5% respectively. The value 
for α is set by the program but could vary according to the employee’s rank 
and tenure with the enterprise, and the subsidized mortgage rate has been 
steadily in the 4.5% range over the past several years.  
 
The two rental parameters are the initial rental rate R0 and its growth rate g
R. 
These parameters are set to 1000 Yuan per year and 2%, respectively. The 
initial rental rate is consistent with that of a very junior employee. The model 
sets the growth rate in the rental rate to be equal to the growth rate in 
housing prices under the theory that in the long run rental price increases 
should closely mirror increases in housing prices. In some of the simulations 
the model relaxes this assumption and allows the rental growth rate to be 
considerably higher than that of the housing growth rate, to simulate the 
effect of the government increasing the rental rate at an artificially high 
speed as an incentive to participants to purchase their housing. 
 
There are six income-related parameters in the model. The initial income 
level, y0, is set to 12,000 Yuan per year, and the income growth rate, g
Y
, is set 
to 5%. The risk-free rate, which is the rate paid on the HPF account, is set to 
                                                 
24 China Real Estate Development Statistics, Beijing, 2001. The Chinese Housing Provident Fund   17 
 
6.5%, which is consistent with the Chinese risk-free rate in the recent past. 
One can see from this that the government does heavily subsidize the HPF 
mortgage rate, r
s, which is 4.5%. The employer match of HPF employee’s 
funds contributions, ξ, is set to 1 and the mandatory contribution from the 
employee is 6%. Both of these parameters are the values the program 
currently uses. The initial wealth of the participant, W0, is set to 0. Since this 
parameter appears on both sides of Eq. (5), it simply washes out and one can 
set it to 0 without loss of generality. 
 
The final two parameters relate to the horizon of the employee. The 
parameter T is the time before the employee exits the HPF program in its 
entirety and liquidates all of their assets. The model assumes this happens 
upon the retirement of the employee. The base value for T is 45 years, which 
corresponds to the horizon for a 20 year old beginning their career. The 
second horizon parameter is τ, the date when the employee purchases their 
housing unit. Although this parameter has a base value of 10 years, in each 
of the simulations the model examines a variety of values for τ. 
 
When considering these parameter values, one must keep in mind that the 
purpose of these simulations is not to precisely replicate the Chinese 
economy or to provide a robust estimate of the value of the HPF program to 
a particular employee. Rather, they are conducted to illustrate the relative 
effects of each parameter on employee wealth, and to do so using values that 








Using the base parameter set, the net present benefit for the HPF participant 
is 24,175 Yuan, which is slightly more than 2 times the initial base salary, Y0, 
of 12,000 Yuan. One value, of course, presents only a very limited view of 
the model. To present a more complete view, Tables 3-6 demonstrate the net 
present benefit to the participant under a variety of parameter combinations 
and with differing times until the participant purchases their house. 18  Buttimer, Gu and Yang 
   





Other parameter values: T=45 years, y0=12,000 Yuan, H0=175,000, r
s=4.5%, M0=300, g
M=3%, 
α=33%, β=6%, ξ=1, R0=1000, g
R=2%. 
 
Panel A, τ=0.5 years 
  r
f






Y 2% 6% 10% 2% 6% 10%  2%  6%  10% 
2% 49,892  407,898 2,580,119 14,611 159,807  1,042,600 969 59,707 418,323
6% 81,075  439,081 2,611,302 31,985 177,180  1,059,974 11,136 69,873 428,490
10% 195,087 553,092 2,725,314 90,477 235,672 1,118,465 42,315 101,053 459,669
 
Panel B, τ=10 years 
  r
f






Y 2% 6% 10% 2% 6% 10%  2%  6%  10% 
2% 56,433  390,270 2,525,834 19,967 151,178  1,012,694 5,452 55,658 401,240
6% 87,887  421,724 2,557,288 36,787 167,998  1,029,514 14,709 64,915 410,496
10% 202,255 536,092 2,671,656 94,556 225,766 1,087,283 44,704 94,910 440,491
 
Panel C, τ= 20 years 
  r
f






Y 2% 6% 10% 2% 6% 10%  2%  6%  10% 
2% 61,850  369,940 2,429,536 24,163 144,611  971,270 8,525 54,661 384,447
6% 93,954  402,045 2,461,641 40,349 160,243  986,902 18,460 62,196 391,982
10% 208,226 517,658 2,577,254 98,842 215,761 1,042,420 49,642 88,962 418,748
Panel D, τ=30 years 
  r
f






Y 2% 6% 10% 2% 6% 10%  2%  6%  10% 
2% 65,797  347,442 2,263,056 28,936 139,488  909,067 14,552 55,358 363,587
6% 96,980  380,131 2,295,744 46,311 154,186  923,766 24,722 61,963 369,950
10% 210,991 496,738 2,413,252 104,805 210,521  976,277 55,905 93,145 392,967
 
Panel E, τ=45 years 
  r
f






Y 2% 6% 10% 2% 6% 10%  2%  6%  10% 
2% 69,033  309,751 1,766,012 34,405 132,274  724,345 19,073 58,863 299,582
6% 100,216  340,934 1,797,194 51,781 149,650 741,721 29,243 69,033 309,751
10% 214,227 454,945 1,911,205 110,274 208,143  800,214 60,425 100,216 340,934
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The Effects of Housing and Income Growth Rates  
 





their base parameter values. These parameters are the ones that most directly 
affect the employee’s income, the cash they accumulate in their housing fund, 
and the house value. Table 3 consists of five panels, each with a different 
value of τ. In Panel A, τ is set to six months, meaning the employee 
purchases the house as soon as they are eligible to do so under the program. 
In Panel B, τ is set to 10 years, in Panel C it is set to 20 years, in Panel D it is 
30 years, and in Panel E it is set to the maximum at 45 years. Panel E 
corresponds to the situation where the participant purchases their house at 
the moment they retire; they essentially treat the HPF as a retirement account. 
They never purchase the house to live in, but rather only purchase it and 
immediately resell it upon their exiting the HPF program. Since the 
government will sell the housing units at the price αHT, and presumably the 
employee can resell it immediately at HT, the model assumes they act 
rationally and exploit the arbitrage. 
 
Table 3 varies the other parameters within each panel. The risk free rate, r
f, 
is set to 4%, 6%, and 8%. The housing growth rate, g
H, is set to 2%, 6%, and 
10%, and the income growth rate, g
Y, is set to 2%, 6%, and 10%. 
  
It is clear from Table 3 that the parameter that is most influential to the 
participant’s net present benefit is the housing growth rate, g
H. For example, 
in Panel A, with r
f set to 4% and g
Y set to 2%, changing g
H from 2% to 10% 
results in the participant’s wealth increase changing from 49,892 Yuan to 
2,580,119 Yuan.
25 Similarly, if r
f is set to 8%, and g
Y is held at 2%, changing 
g
H from 2% to 10%, results in the participant’s wealth increase changing 
from 969 Yuan to 418,323 Yuan. Panels A, B, C, and D of Table 3 
demonstrate that increasing the housing growth rate monotonically increases 
the participant’s wealth.  
  
Increasing the risk-free rate has two effects on a HPF participant. The first 
effect is that it increases their earnings on the HPF account, thus reducing 
the size of the mortgage they must use for a given τ value. The second effect 
is that all of the cash flows are now discounted at a higher rate, which 
reduces the present value of the future benefits of the HPF. Given that some 
of the most valuable benefits of HPF occur very far in the future, this effect 
can be significant. The results in Table 3 show that holding everything else 
constant, increasing r
f will reduce the wealth of the employee. For example, 
 
25 At first glance the net present benefit of 2,580,119 Yuan is startling. One must keep in mind, 
however, that nearly all of this value comes from the increase in the house value. Note that 
under a continuous compounding rate of 10%, a house that has an initial value of 175,000 Yuan 
would be worth 9,554,676 Yuan after 40 years. 20  Buttimer, Gu and Yang 
   
                                                
in Panel A, with r
f equal to 4% and g
Y and g
H set equal to 2%, increasing r
f 
from 4% to 8% results in a decrease in the net present benefit of joining HPF 
from 49,892 Yuan to 969 Yuan. Similarly, with g
Y
 and g
H each set at 10%, 
increasing r
f from 4% to 8% results in a decrease in the net present benefit of 
joining HPF from 2,725,314 Yuan to 459,669 Yuan.  
 
One parameter that the employee controls is τ, so it is interesting to examine 
how various values of τ can affect the employee’s net present benefit. This is 
a way of examining the employee’s optimal holding period for their option 
to purchase the house.
26 Reading vertically across panels allows one to 
examine this issue. For example, increasing τ from 0.5 year to 45 years, 
given values for r
f, g
Y, and g
H of 4%, 2%, and 2%, respectively, results in the 
employee’s net present benefit increasing from 49,892 Yuan to 69,033 Yuan. 
Given that the growth rate in housing is so low, the employee is better off 
delaying their purchase of housing for as long as possible and continuing to 
earn the higher risk free rate of return. On the other hand when g
H is greater 
than r
f, the employee is better off purchasing the housing as soon as possible. 




H have values of 4%, 10%, and 10%, respectively. In this case the net 
present benefit is 2,580,119 Yuan when τ is 0.5 years and only 1,911,205 
Yuan when τ is 45 years. This basic pattern – delay purchasing when g
H
 is 
low and purchase as soon as possible when g
H is high - repeats regardless of 
whether g
Y is high or low.
27  
 
Perhaps the most intriguing result in Table 3 is when g
H is set to be slightly 
less than r
f, i.e. when g
H=6% and r
f=8%. Regardless of the g
Y value, the HPF 
participant’s Net Present Benefit is roughly equal when τ is either set to .5 
years or 45 years, but follows a U-shaped pattern for τ values of 10, 20 or 30 
years. The risk free rate is not large enough to allow it to dominate the 
growth rate housing in the early years: it takes many decades for the risk-free 
rate’s higher value to overcome the initial advantage that immediate 
purchase provides due to the subsidized house purchase price. This means 
that for employees with a shorter time horizon (i.e. older employees) that 
immediate purchase is optimal, but that employees with a longer time 
horizon (i.e. younger employees) will be indifferent between immediate 
purchasing their housing and delaying their purchase for a very long time. 
  
One implication that can be drawn from Table 3 is that the employee’s 
expectations regarding the future growth rate of housing may be more 
 
26 One must solve for the optimal holding period numerically. 
27 We note that when analyzing these results we place to constraints on the employee – a 
minimum purchase time (τ=0.5 years) and a maximum purchase horizon (τ=45 years), so that 
when we discuss an optimal time to purchase we necessarily mean a constrained optimum. This 
causes many of our results to be corner solutions.  The Chinese Housing Provident Fund   21 
 
                                                
important in their decision as to when they purchase their housing than is 
their perception as to the growth rate in their salary. In other words, the 
optimal behavior of the employee is determined by the relative attractiveness 





The Effects of the Income Match and the House Price Discount 
 
The HPF program contains various discounts and subsidies for participants. 
Two of the most important such benefits are the matching of the employee’s 
contribution by their employer and the discount on the house price they get 
for participating in the HPF. Table 4 examines the relative effect of these 
benefits on the employee’s net present benefit, and how that might affect the 
employee’s decision as to when to make their purchase.  
 
Specifically, Table 4 examines the effects that four parameters, τ, T, α, and ξ, 
have on the employee’s net present benefit. Recall that α is the percentage of 
the housing unit’s “market” price that the employee must pay under HPF, 
and  ξ is the rate at which the government matches the employee’s HPF 
contributions. These two parameters provide mechanisms through which the 
government can reduce the cost of the housing and increase the employee’s 
wealth. The effect of α on the employee’s wealth ends at time τ, when the 
participant purchases their housing unit; the effect of ξ, however, depends on 
both τ and T. It depends upon τ because ξ and τ jointly determine the amount 
of cash the employee will have to make a down payment.
29 It depends upon 
T since the employee must continue to make contributions to HPF even after 
they purchase the housing unit. Table 4 consists of three panels that are 
characterized by differing time horizons T, for the investor. Within each 
panel are various net present benefit values for combinations of τ, α, and ξ. 
 
The most striking feature of the results in Table 4 is that for many parameter 
combinations the net present benefit is negative, indicating that it is a net 
wealth loss for the employee to join HPF. Presumably the employee would 
not join HPF if they had the option of not joining. This does raise the issue 
of whether the Chinese government’s decision to mandate participation in 
the program was in the best interest of all participants. 
 
28 There is obviously a lower limit to this, since the homeowner must be able to make the basic 
mortgage payments.  
29 For a given set of values of r
f, y0, and g
Y, 22  Buttimer, Gu and Yang 
   
Table 4: Net present benefit of joining HPF in Yuan for various values 
of T, τ, α, and ξ 






M=3%, β=.06, R0=1000, g
R=2%. 
 
Panel A, T=10 years 
  α 
 0.33  0.66  1 
  ξ 
  ξ   ξ  
τ  0 0.5 1  0 0.5 1  0  0.5  1 
0.5 68,364  71,682 74,999 19,903 23,221 26,538 –30,026 –26,709 –23,391
5 71,614  74,809 78,004 29,437 32,632 35,827 –14,018 –10,823 –7,628
10 74,762  78,105 81,448 37,939 41,282 44,625 0 3,343 6,686
 
Panel B, T=25 years 
  α
 
 0.33  0.66  1 
  ξ 
  ξ   ξ  
τ
  0 0.5 1  0 0.5 1  0  0.5  1 
0.5 24,260  31,721 39,182 –18,365 –10,904 –3,443 –62,282 –54,821 –47,360
5 27,617  34,734 41,851 –8,175 –1,059 6,058 –45,052 –37,935 –30,819
10 30,635  37,499 44,364 868 7,733 14,597 –29,800 –22,936 –16,071
25 38,066  45,571 53,076 19,317 26,822 34,327 0 7,505 15,010
 
Panel C, T=45 years 
  α
 
 0.33  0.66  1 
  ξ 
  ξ   ξ  
τ
  0 0.5 1  0 0.5 1  0  0.5  1 
0.5 –3,903 7,825 19,553 –43,958 –32,230 –20,502 –85,226 –73,498 –61,770
5 –500  10,786 22,073 –33,479 –22,193 –10,907 –67,458 –56,171 –44,882
10 2,461  13,318 24,176 –24,197 –13,339 –2,482 –51,662 –40,805 –29,947
25 8,184  19,127 30,908 –6,368 –3,732 13,833 –21,361 –11,267 –1,160
35 12,311  24,091 35,872 989 12,137 23,917 –9,516 822 11,600
45 15,476  27,257 39,037 7,854 19,634 31,414 0 11,780 23,560
 
 
So what causes this result? Clearly the net present benefit is most likely to be 
negative when the house price discount is small. Consider that if there is no 
discount, i.e. if α=1, then the HPF participant must take on a mortgage that is 
significantly larger than their rental payments. Further, because in the base 
case the housing growth rate is considerably lower than the risk-free rate, 
they are not earning much on their housing investment. The HPF participant 
must also take on the additional cost of maintenance for the property. Note, 
however, that the net present benefit can only be negative if the HPF 
participant purchases their house prior to time T. By waiting until time T the 
participant avoids the maintenance costs and the additional cost of the debt 
service, their money earns the risk-free rate, and they get the benefit of 
capturing the price discount if there is any. 
 
While the net present benefit is increasing with respect to both α and ξ, The Chinese Housing Provident Fund   23 
 
Table 4 demonstrates that α has by far the biggest effect. The reason for this 
is because the house value, and hence any significant discount from it, far 
outweighs the employee’s income, including any match the government may 
provide. The scales on which these two parameters operate are on different 
orders of magnitude. To see this, realize that if y0 is 12,000, the initial year’s 
match by the government will be 720 Yuan. A discount on the house price, 
however, could be much more valuable. Consider that a discount of 67% of 
the house price, which is the difference between setting α to 1 and setting it 
to 0.33, would be 117,250 Yuan if the house price stayed constant at 
175,000 Yuan. If the house price is increasing, the benefit would be even 
greater. 
 
By comparing values across time horizons, T, one sees that net present 
benefit is decreasing in T. Further, the employee can maximize their gain (or 
minimize their losses) by delaying their purchase of the property as long as 
possible. This is a function of the values of the base parameters g
H and r
f, 
which are 2% and 6.5% respectively. As Table 3 demonstrated if g
H is less 
than r
f, then in general the participant can increase their wealth by delaying 
their purchase of the house and investing in the risk-free asset since its return 
is higher. If g
H were higher than r
f, the opposite results would hold. It is also 
the case that if g




The Effect of Raising Rental Rates 
 
As documented earlier in this paper, one incentive that the Chinese 
government has used to reduce the number of people living in public 
housing has been to aggressively raise the rent on these properties. The 
purpose of Table 5 is to examine how various rent growth rates, g
R, affect 
the HPF participant’s net marginal benefit as well as the timing of their 
purchase.  
 
Specifically, Table 5 examines the effect of four parameters, T, τ, g
H, and g
R, 
on the employee’s net present benefit.  Once again, the table consists of three 
panels, Panels A, B, and C, where the participants time horizon (T) is set to 
10, 25 or 45 years, respectively. Within each panel, g
H and g
Y each take on 
values of 2%, 6%, and 10%, and τ varies from a minimum of 0.5 years to a 
maximum equal to T.  
 
The results in Table 5 display some of the same basic characteristics of 
Table 3. In general higher g
H values dramatically increase the participant’s 
net present benefit. Once again, for higher values of g
H the participant’s 
optimal strategy, regardless of the value of g
R, is to reduce τ as much as 24  Buttimer, Gu and Yang 
   
possible by purchasing the housing unit immediately upon attaining 
eligibility. Although this is slightly more beneficial at higher g
R values, the 
primary benefit comes not from avoiding the increased rent, but rather from 
gaining the high housing growth rate. For all situations where g
H
 is 6% or 
greater, it is always optimal, regardless of the value of g
R
, to purchase the 
housing unit when τ=0.5 year. 
 




Other parameter values: y0=12,000 Yuan, g
Y=5%,  r
f=6.5%,  H0=175,000,  ξ=1.0,  α=0.33,  r
s=4.5%, 
M0=300, g
M=3%, β=6%, R0=1000 
 
Panel A, T=10 years 
  g
H





τ  2% 6% 10%  2%  6% 10%  2%  6% 10% 
0.5 74,999  76,696 78,910 128,900 130,597 132,811 209,773 211,470 213,684
5 78,004  79,245 80,938 123,546 124,787 126,480 194,012 195,253 196,946
10 81,448 81,448 81,448 118,212 118,212 118,212 173,072 173,072 173,072
 
Panel B, T=25 years 
  g
H






  2% 6% 10%  2%  6% 10%  2%  6% 10% 
0.5 39,182  47,670 64,133 135,944 144,432 160,894 400,432 408,920 425,382
5 41,851  49,883 65,824 131,549 139,581 155,522 387,236 395,268 411,209
10 44,364 51,155 65,403 127,347 134,138 148,386 370,873 377,664 391,912
25 53,076 53,076 53,076 118,483 118,483 118,483 296,278 296,278 296,278
 
Panel C, T=45 years 
  g
H







  2% 6% 10%  2%  6% 10%  2%  6% 10% 
0.5 19,553  40,556 109,704 135,385 156,388 225,536 840,199 861,202 930,350
5 22,073  42,620 111,247 131,412 151,959 220,586 828,133 848,681 917,307
10 24,176 43,482 110,416 127,706 147,013 213,946 813,787 833,093 900,027
25 30,908 43,422 96,108 120,022 132,536 185,222 757,692 770,207 822,892
35 35,872 42,393 74,964 117,352 123,873 156,444 696,661 703,182 735,751
45 39,037 39,037 39,037 117,187 117,187 117,187 589,965 589,965 589,965
  
The only case where g
R
 makes a marginal difference in the participant’s 
optimal τ value is when the housing growth rate is at 2%. Recall from Table 
3 that when the housing growth rate is sufficiently low it becomes optimal 
for the HPF participant to delay their purchase of the property as long as 
possible. This allows the participant to earn the risk-free rate as long as 
possible before they invest in the lower-returning house. Indeed, this is the 
exact pattern seen in Table 5 when g
H is 2% and g
R is also set at 2%. If, 
however, the rental growth rate is raised to either 6% or 10%, and the The Chinese Housing Provident Fund   25 
participant’s time horizon is sufficiently long, i.e., either 25 or 45 years, it 
can be the case that the additional rental cost could outweigh the benefit of 
earning the risk-free rate, making the optimal τ value shorter than T.  
 
To see this, consider the Panel C, when T=45 years, and the case where 
g
H=2%, and g
R=10%. As one increases τ from 0.5 years to 5 years, the net 
present benefit increases from 109,704 Yuan to 111,247 Yuan. Increasing τ 
from 5 years to 10 years, however, decreases the net present benefit to 
110,416 Yuan, and this decrease continues as τ increases until when it 
reaches 45 years, when the net present benefit is only 39,037. Thus, the 
optimal purchase time for the HPF participant would be at five years. If g
R 
were only 2%, however, the optimal purchase time would be at 45 years. 
Thus, in a low housing growth rate environment, the government could alter 
the participant’s optimal behavior by increasing the rental rate on the 
property. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates a similar situation. This plot essentially presents 
expanded data from the third data column of Panel B. The figure is a plot of 
the net present benefit to the participant when τ is set equal to values of 
between 0.5 years and 25 years, for g
H=2% and g
R=10%. Note that in this 
case the net present value initially increases as τ increases and then in year 7 
declines and declines every year thereafter. In this situation, the optimal 
value of τ for the participant would be 7 years. 
 






Other Parameter values: H0=175,000,  M0=300;  g




f=6.5%, α=.33, R0=1000, ξ=1, β=6% 
 
 
One effect at first counter-intuitive is that when τ is equal to T, changing g
R 
does not affect the participant’s net present benefit. To understand this one 
must recall that net present benefit is the difference between the employee’s 
position if they rented and were not a participant in HPF minus their position 
given that they are in HPF, as outlined in Eq. (9). If τ=T, the employee’s 
rental cash expenditures are exactly the same in both cases, and so changes 26  Buttimer, Gu and Yang 
   
                                                
in the rental growth rate do not affect the participant’s net present benefit. 
 
The Effect of the Mortgage Subsidy and the Maintenance Growth Rate 
  
A primary stated motivation for the privatization of public housing has been 
the rapid increase in government-born maintenance costs. This begs the 
question as to why an individual would be willing to take on these costs if 
the government finds them so onerous. One potential answer to that question 
is that it may be the case that an owner-occupant of the property can 
maintain the house more efficiently than can the government. Also, the 
physical deterioration of an owner occupied property tends to be much 
milder than a renter occupied property since the owner has an incentive not 
to abuse the property. 
  
If maintenance costs significantly detract from the attractiveness of the 
program one option available to the government would be to provide an 
additional subsidy to the homeowner. This subsidy could either be direct or 
indirect. From the perspective of this model a direct subsidy would show up 
simply as a lower growth rate in maintenance costs. One way of providing 
an indirect subsidy would be to subsidize the mortgage rate. In fact, the 
mortgage rate is already subsidized, having averaged 4.5% over the past 
several years when the risk free rate has been closer to 6.5%.
30 A benefit of 
subsidizing the mortgage rate – as opposed to other subsidies such as 
increasing ξ – is that the subsidy would only start after the HPF participant 
purchased their housing unit.  
 
Table 6 examines how g
M and r
s affect the net present benefit of the HPF 
participant for various combinations of T and τ. The table consists of Panels 
A, B, and C. As in Tables 4 and 5 the panels correspond to different T values, 
but in this case T takes on values of 10, 25, and 45 years, respectively. 
Within each panel τ is set to a range of values from 0.5 years to the value of 
T, g
M is set to values of 2%, 6%, and 10%, and r
s is set to values of 2.5%, 
6.5%, and 10.5%. The values of r
s
 were selected to correspond to three states: 
a heavily subsidized rate (2.5%), a marginally subsidized rate (6.5%, which 
is the same as the risk-free rate), and a non-subsidized rate (10.5%). 
 
While it is the case that increasing g
M monotonically reduces the net present 
benefit to the HPF participant, the magnitude of this reduction varies 
depending upon the participant’s time horizon T and the expected time of 
house purchase, τ. In Panel A, where T is set to 10 years, the effect of g
M is 
very small. In Panel C, where T is set to 45 years, when τ is 0.5 years the 
effects of increasing g
M are large. In the case where r
s is 6.5%, increasing g
M 
 
30 China Real Estate Development Statistics, Beijing 2001 The Chinese Housing Provident Fund   27 
 
from 2% to 10% reduces the net present benefit to the HPF participant by 
27,046 Yuan, taking them from a positive net benefit of 3,351 Yuan to a 
negative net benefit of –23,695 Yuan. If τ is set to 35 years, however, the 
same change in g
M results in only a decrease of only 21,728 Yuan in net 
present benefit. The reason for this is, of course, that as τ increases, the 
participant bears the maintenance cost for a shorter period of time. 
 




Other parameter values: y0=12,000 Yuan, g
Y=.05,  r
f=6.5%,  H0=175,000,  g
H=2%,  ξ=1.0,  α=0.33, 
M0=300, β=6%, R0=1000, g
R=2% 
 
Panel A, T=10 years 
  r
s





τ  2% 6%  10%  2% 6% 10% 2%  6%  10% 
0.5 82,902  82,393 81,729 67,097 66,588  65,923 51,291 50,782 50,118 
5 81,349  80,977 80,469 74,659 74,287  73,779 67,970 67,597 67,089 
10 81,448  81,448 81,448 81,448 81,448  81,448 81,448 81,448 81,448 
 
Panel B, T=25 years 
  r
s






  2% 6%  10%  2% 6% 10% 2%  6%  10% 
0.5 52,846  50,300 45,361 25,518 22,972  18,033 –1,809 –4,356 –9,294 
5 50,620  48,210 43,428 33,081 30,672  25,889 15,542 13,133 8,350 
10 48,858  46,820 42,546 39,870 37,832  33,558 30,882 28,844 24,570 
25 53,076  53,076 53,076 53,076 53,076  53,076 53,076 53,076 53,076 
 
Panel C, T=45 years 
  r
s






  2% 6%  10%  2% 6% 10% 2%  6%  10% 
0.5 35,755  29,454 8,710 3,351 –2,950  –23,695 –29,054 –35,355 –56,099 
5 33,232  27,068 6,480 10,319 4,749  –15,893 –11,405 –17,570 –38,158 
10 30,650  24,858 4,778 17,702 11,910  -8,170 4,754 –1,038 –21,118 
25 30,908  27,153 11,347 30,908 27,153  11,347 30,908 27,153 11,347 
35 35,872  33,915 24,144 35,872 33,915  24,144 35,872 33,915 24,144 
45 39,307  39,307 39,307 39,307 39,307  39,307 39,307 39,307 39,307 
 
 
The mortgage rate, r
s, also plays a major role in the value of the HPF 
program to the participant. As in the case of g
M, the magnitude of the effect 
of r
s on the net present benefit to the participant is a function of both T and τ. 
For example, when r
s is equal to 10.5%, increasing the participant’s time 
horizon from 10 to 45 years, while holding τ constant at .5 years, and with 
g
M at only 2%, results in a decline of 80,285 Yuan, from 51,291 Yuan to -
29,054 Yuan. There are a couple of reasons why increasing T results in such 28  Buttimer, Gu and Yang 
   
a large decline in the participant’s net benefit. One obvious reason is because 
with the increased T value, the participant pays the mortgage rate for a 
longer time, but it is also the case that with the longer time horizon the 
participant bears the maintenance cost for a longer time. If the mortgage rate 
were subsidized, however, increasing T will still decrease the value of the 
net present benefit, but it will be a significantly smaller amount. For example, 
with  r
s at 2.5%, and with g
M at 2%, the net present benefit declines by 
27,456 Yuan – roughly one third of the decline when r
s is set to 10.5%. 
  
There are a couple of surprising results in Table 6 that deserve mentioning. 
The first is that when τ and T are set equal to each other neither g
M nor r
s 
affect the participant’s net present benefit. As noted earlier, when τ and T are 
equal the model assumes that the HPF participant purchases and immediately 
resells the property, thus they never bear maintenance costs, nor do they 
receive a mortgage subsidy. The second surprising and somewhat anomalous 
result is that, given the large discount on the house (i.e. the low α value), the 
low housing growth rate (g
H), and the relatively high growth in income (g
Y) 
assumed in this Table, the HPF participant would accumulate enough cash in 
their HPF account after about 24 years to purchase their house without using 
a mortgage. This is why in Panel C, when τ greater than or equal to 25 years, 





The Housing Provident Fund is quite complex and presents the potential 
homeowner with a number of options that could greatly affect their lifetime 
wealth. This paper presents an economic model of the HPF from the 
participating employee’s perspective. In particular it derives the lifetime 
wealth change for a participant in the program relative to their wealth if they 
had continued to rent public housing. The paper then solves this model under 
a variety of parameter values.  
  
From these results one can infer the optimal behavior for a rational program 
participant. This allows one to draw further inferences about which key 
parameters are the ones that best incentive program participants to minimize 
the time that they stay in the program prior to purchasing their unit. Given 
that a stated goal of the government is to privatize housing as quickly as 
possible, identifying these key parameters is important. 
  
The results from Tables 3-6 demonstrate that the parameter that most 
strongly affects participant’s wealth is the future growth rate of housing. 
When this parameter is high, relative to the risk-free rate, the participant’s 
optimal strategy is to purchase their housing as soon as possible; conversely, The Chinese Housing Provident Fund   29 
 
when it is low, their optimal strategy is to delay their purchase as long as 
possible. Unfortunately, this is also one parameter that it is virtually 
impossible for any government to control. 
  
There are, however, other parameters that are much easier for the 
government to control, with the easiest perhaps being the growth rate in 
rents for public housing. While it is clear from Table 5 that increasing the 
growth rate in rents will, at the margin, tend to reduce the optimal time for a 
participant to be in the program before purchasing their housing, the 
magnitude of this effect is small. From a policy standpoint the difficulty is 
that even at high rental growth rates, the option to delay purchasing can still 
be valuable. 
  
Whereas increasing the rental growth rate increases the attractiveness of 
purchasing by reducing the value of renting, increasing the discount offered 
on the house price, i.e. decreasing the parameter α, increases the 
attractiveness of purchasing by increasing the payoff to the participant. 
Unfortunately, both parameters have the same shortcoming; altering their 
values can increase the value of joining HPF, but they do not necessarily 
minimize the optimal time-until-purchase of the participant. 
 
Perhaps the most effective parameter that the government can easily set and 
that provides an incentive to the participant to minimize the time before they 
purchase their housing is the mortgage interest rate subsidy. In many cases 
reducing the mortgage rate to below the risk-free rate minimizes the optimal 
time to purchase the housing unit, while in other cases it greatly reduces the 
benefit of delaying the purchase. 
  
The Housing Provident Fund is one tool that the Chinese government has 
developed in its efforts to privatize housing that has previously been publicly 
owned. The program has had some success over the past decade in assisting 
in the privatization of the Chinese urban housing stock. Of course those 
citizens that were most likely to privatize have already done so. The 
challenge for HPF is to motivate those participants that are in the system but 
have not yet purchased their housing. This paper demonstrates that by 
careful selection of certain program parameters, the government can set up 
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